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COMMENTS 
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE WORK: HOW MODERN 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING THE JUDICIARY'S 
APPROACH TO WORK-AT-HOME ARRANGEMENTS AS 
AN ADA ACCOMMODATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, Jack Nilles, a researcher with the University of 
Southern California, coined the term "teleworking."1 His idea was 
to create a more flexible communication system for employees, 
reduce the need for transportation, and ultimately decentralize 
the traditional workplace.2 Six years later, Marvin Minsky, a pro-
fessor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT"), first 
used the term "telepresence."3 Minsky sought to create a phenom-
enon whereby people could use technology to replicate their pres-
ence in an environment where they were not physically present.4 
Decades later, these social pioneers' ideas have merged to cre-
ate "robotic telepresence," a form of technology which enables 
employees to project their likeness onto mobile robots while they 
1. Biography of Jack Nilles, JALA INT'L, http://www.jala.com/jnmbio.php (last modi-
fied Sept. 26, 2011). 
2. See Jennifer Mears, Father of Telecommuting Jack Nilles Says Security, Manag-
ing Remote Workers Remain Big Hurdles, NETWORK WORLD (May 15, 2007, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2299251/computers/father-of-telecommuting-jack-
nilles-says-security--managing-remote-workers-remain-big-hurd.html (quoting Jack Nilles' 
initial thoughts about telecommuting and his perceptions on how his ideas contrasted with 
those of the "business world"). 
3. Wijnand A. IJsselsteijn, History of Telepresence, in 3D VIDEOCOMMUNICATION: 
ALGORITHMS, CONCEPTS, AND REAL-TIME SYSTEMS IN HUMAN CENTRED COMMUNICATION 
7, 7 (Oliver Schreer, Peter Kauff & Thomas Sikora eds., 2005). 
4. See id. ("[Telepresence] refers to the phenomenon that a human operator develops 
a sense of being physically present at a remote location through interaction with the sys-
tem's human interface, that is, through the user's actions and the subsequent perceptual 
feedback he/she receives via the appropriate teleoperation technology."). 
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work conveniently from a location of their choice. 5 However, this 
technology is only in its early stages, and creators are already de-
veloping ideas to make the robots more lifelike by adding features 
such as limbs and even skin.6 
Telepresence is only one example of the endless ways in which 
technology is constantly evolving to reduce the need for employ-
ees to be physically present in their employers' offices.7 This phe-
nomenon has forced the courts to reconsider the definition of the 
workplace in the employment law context.8 Nowhere has this 
shift been more evident than in judicial analysis of teleworking as 
a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA''). While courts have long applied case law princi-
ples to determine whether an accommodation within the tradi-
tional workplace is reasonable under the ADA, emerging 
technology now forces courts to question whether an employee's 
physical presence in the office is necessary to perform the essen-
tial functions of his or her work.9 As a result, courts must respond 
by amending their analysis so as to appropriately address modern 
teleworking arrangements. Absent such analytical changes, 
which appropriately consider the extent to which modern tele-
communications technology has changed the work dynamic, 
courts will tend to look unfairly upon work-at-home accommoda-
tions that allow the employee to work as if he or she is physically 
present in the office. 
5. Robotic telepresence technology, such as the Beam Pro, is equipped with sensors, 
which allow the user to see and hear the surrounding environment as well as a camera 
and speaker that allow the user to interact with others in that environment. See, e.g., Seth 
Stevenson, Wish I Were There: The Beam Telepresence Robot Lets You Be in Tu;o Places at 
Once, SLATE (May 1, 2014, 11:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technolo 
gy/2014/05/beam_pro_telepresence_robot_how _it_ wor ks_and_ why _it_is_strangely _alluring 
.html. Furthermore, the robot can be maneuvered throughout an office setting simply by 
using the arrow keys on a computer. Id. 
6. Your Alter Ego on Wheels, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/technology-quarterly/21572916-robotics-remotely-controlled-telepresence-robots-let-
people-be-two-places. 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 53-89 (discussing modern teleworking technol-
ogy). 
8. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he law must 
respond to the advance of technology in the employment context, as it has in other areas of 
modern life, and recognize that the 'workplace' is anywhere that an employee can perform 
her job duties.") (internal citation omitted) vacated en bane, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
9. See id. at 640-44. 
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This comment addresses the extent to which the evolving defi-
nition of the "workplace" has upset the courts' traditional ap-
proach to teleworking as a reasonable accommodation for disa-
bled employees under the ADA and ultimately necessitated 
changes in the reasonable accommodation framework. Part I dis-
cusses the history and purpose of the ADA and the traditional 
framework that courts apply to determine whether an accommo-
dation is reasonable. Part II discusses the development of tele-
working and how the courts generally apply the reasonable ac-
commodation framework to proposed teleworking accommoda-
tions. Part III discusses the ways that reasonable accommoda-
tion analysis has adapted, and must continue to adapt, to innova-
tions in telecommunications technology and ultimately proposes a 
new test for telework that recognizes the modern definition of the 
workplace. Finally, Part IV identifies defenses that employers 
may raise to ADA telework accommodation claims in the modern 
era of telecommunications technology. This comment concludes 
that in order for a court to address the evolving nature of the 
workplace and accurately consider whether teleworking is area-
sonable accommodation under the ADA, it must apply a test that 
considers whether the work-at-home accommodation renders the 
employee functionally present at the traditional workplace for the 
purposes of his or her job duties. 
I. THE ADA AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
Though the ADA is an expansive statute, the scope of this 
comment is primarily limited to the reasonable accommodation 
requirement under Title I. This part discusses the standards that 
courts apply to determine whether there is a duty to accommo-
date, the way that courts define reasonable accommodation, and 
an exception that employers might utilize under the ADA. 
A. ADA Development 
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 as one aspect of a series of 
civil rights legislation designed to reduce discriminatory decisions 
in the workplace. 10 The statute was preceded by the Rehabilita-
10. See The Law, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/thelaw/ (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2015). Perhaps the earliest federal legislation directly relating to employment dis-
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tion Act of 1973, which provided protection to disabled federal 
employees and contractors. 11 However, the Rehabilitation Act was 
seen as inadequate to address the needs of disabled Americans on 
a more comprehensive level, and Congress ultimately responded 
by passing the ADA with an overwhelming majority. 12 
The ADA was designed not only to protect disabled individuals 
from discriminatory employment decisions, but also as an effort 
to reduce strains on public welfare resources.13 Before the ADA, 
many disabled persons who were otherwise capable of working 
were forced to rely on public assistance because of misconceptions 
about their ability to perform in the workplace. 14 Despite this 
purpose, advocates have struggled to convince employers to invest 
in ideological change. 15 However, as technology has continued to 
advance, reducing costs and efforts that employers must make to 
accommodate the disabled, courts have become increasingly will-
ing to enforce the law with greater stringency. 16 
B. Duty to Provide Reasonable Accommodations 
Title I of the ADA provides employment-based protections 
against disability discrimination. 17 An employee is only protected 
against discrimination by employers covered under the ADA 
crimination was the Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibiting sex-based discrimination in wages. 
Id. This was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and then the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990. Id. More recently, Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act of 2008 to prevent discrimination in the workplace based on genetic infor-
mation. Genetic Information Discrimination, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ 
genetic.cfm (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
11. MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 657 (2d ed. 2010). 
12. Brianne M. Sullenger, Comment, 'Telecommuting: A Reasonable Accommodation 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act as 'Technology Advances, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 
537, 538 (2007). 
13. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 657. 
14. See id. (discussing the welfare policy underlying the ADA and the belief that oth-
erwise capable individuals were being forced to rely on public assistance). 
15. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 
44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 921, 924 (2003) ("(T]he ADA was enacted before the disability 
rights movement had a full opportunity to educate the public about the important princi-
. ples that underlay the new law. As a result, employers and other entities regulated by the 
ADA have resisted full compliance."). 
16. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reduced thresh-
old for finding that an accommodation is reasonable). 
17. See Sullenger, supra note 12, at 539. 
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when the employee is considered a "qualified individual" with a 
disability. 18 Qualified individuals are those who "with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."19 
Disability is broadly defined to include "(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activ-
ities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment."20 
In order to successfully assert a claim of discrimination under 
the ADA, qualified employees must establish that they were dis-
criminated against "on the basis" of their disability. 21 Actions con-
stituting such discrimination include, inter alia, a failure to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees who 
would otherwise be considered qualified individuals under the 
ADA.22 However, no such reasonable accommodations need be 
provided under the ADA if the employer can show that the sug-
gested accommodation "would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity."23 
The initial burden rests upon the employee to show not only 
that he or she is disabled, but also to establish that he or she is a 
qualified individual under the ADA.24 Additionally, the employee 
carries the burden of demonstrating that there is a reasonable ac-
commodation that would allow performance of the essential func-
tions of the work. 25 The burden then shifts to the employer to 
show that the employee cannot perform the work even with the 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
19. Id.§ 12111(8). 
20. Id. § 12102(1). The ADA establishes a rule of construction whereby the definition 
of disability is to be construed broadly in favor of coverage of individuals. Id. § 12102(4)(A). 
This language was added as part of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which was intend-
ed to broaden the scope of individuals covered under the ADA. See Reagan S. Bissonnette, 
Note, Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs After the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, 50 B.C. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009) ("One of the most significant changes of the 
ADAAA was to reject the holdings of the Supreme Court cases that had narrowed the 
scope of coverage under the ADA by limiting the interpretation of 'disability."'). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
22. See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). 
23. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)). 
24. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated en bane, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 (6th Cir. 2014). 
25. See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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accommodation, or that such accommodation would represent an 
undue hardship to the business. 26 
C. Defining Reasonable Accommodations 
Identifying which accommodations are reasonable under the 
ADA has proved challenging for courts.27 Indeed, commentators 
have characterized this provision of the ADA as among the "most 
vague" in the entire statute.28 In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin De-
partment of Administration, Chief Judge Posner, writing for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, stated 
that although accommodation simply requires that the "employer 
must be willing to consider making changes in its ordinary work 
rules, facilities, terms, and conditions .... [t]he difficult term is 
'reasonable."'29 
Congress has shed some light on the matter by providing ex-
amples of accommodations such as modified equipment, restruc-
tured work schedules, or reassignment of employees to vacant po-
sitions. 30 However, the mere existence of a proposed accommo-
dation which might enable a disabled employee to work does not 
render the accommodation presumptively reasonable. As the 
court in Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., noted, "The term 'rea-
sonable' ... would have no meaning if employers were required to 
provide employees . . . every conceivable accommodation possi-
ble."31 
Ultimately, the court must look to both the efficacy and the cost 
of the accommodation in proportion to the benefit it bestows upon 
the disabled employee. 32 This determination tends to involve a 
26. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Monette v. Elect. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)) (explaining the bur-
den-shifting arrangement under the ADA). 
27. See Joan '1'.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its 
Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. 
Bus. L.J. 301, :339-40 (2003) (discussing dissention among commentators and courts as to 
whether work-at-home accommodations are reasonable). 
28. Id. at 339. 
29. 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012). 
31. 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 
867 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The ADA does not require employers to create a new position for a 
disabled employee who can no longer perform the essential functions of his job."). 
32. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43. 
2015] THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE WORK 1235 
highly fact-specific inquiry into both the disabled employee's cir-
cumstances and the needs of the employer. 33 It is this fact-specific 
inquiry that renders the reasonableness of particular accommo-
dations highly dependent upon the technology available at the 
time. 34 Accommodations that may have been highly cost-
prohibitive and impracticable for employers two decades ago may 
be considered only minor inconveniences today.35 
D. The Undue Hardship Defense 
The ADA also provides an exception for employers who might 
otherwise be required to accommodate a disabled employee where 
the proposed accommodation would constitute "an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."36 In 
contrast to a showing of a reasonable accommodation, the burden 
rests upon the employer to establish an undue hardship defense.37 
The ADA also expressly defines "undue hardship" as "an action 
requiring significant difficulty or expense" when considered in 
light of certain factors. 38 These factors include, inter alia, "the na-
ture and cost of the accommodation; the number of persons em-
ployed by the company; the financial resources of the company; 
and the impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the 
company. ,,39 
33. See Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because 
the issue of reasonableness depends on the individual circumstances of each case, this de-
termination requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis of the disabled individual's 
circumstances and the accommodations that might allow him to meet the program's 
standards."). 
34. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated en bane, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 (6th Cir. 2014) ("['l']he law must respond to the advance of 
technology in the employment context, as it has in other areas of modern life .... "). 
35. Compare Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (stating that no reasonable jury could find 
working at home to be a reasonable accommodation given the existing state of technology 
at the time), with Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 642 (stating that advances in technology 
have made a physical presence at the office less important). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
37. See Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)) (explaining burden-
shifting under the ADA). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
39. Rascon v. U.S.W. Commc'ns, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(10) (B)). 
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Inevitably, the undue hardship consideration tends to intersect 
with the reasonableness of the accommodation. 10 However, undue 
hardship analysis under the ADA is largely a product of cost or 
pure impracticability:11 Specifically, courts must look to the costs 
of a particular accommodation in relation to both its benefits and 
the extent to which the employer can afford it.'12 For example, 
courts might excuse an employer from compliance with an other-
wise reasonable accommodation when it is simply too expensive:13 
Thus, smaller and less financially stable companies will be more 
likely to prevail under this defense because larger companies 
have more resources to accommodate employees. 
II. TELEWORKING UNDER THE ADA 
The development of teleworking, along with modern and 
emerging telecommunications technology, has implications for 
the application of reasonable accommodation analysis to tele-
work. Ultimately, advances in technology have proven a challenge 
not only to courts in applying the ADA to telework, but also to the 
legal community in interpreting the court's analysis. 
A. The Development of Teleworking 
The definition of telework varies depending upon the purpose 
for which it is used:11 As the opportunities to telework expanded 
40. See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 670 (explaining the overlap between the rea-
sonableness consideration and the undue hardship consideration when considering the 
cost of an accommodation). 
41. See id. ("The [ADA] also provides employers with an affirmative defense when 
costs are so substantial that they would pose an undue hardship for the particular em-
ployer."); see also Kristen M. Ludgate, Note, Telecommuting and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act: Is Worhing at Home a Reasonable Accommodation?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1309, 
1318 (1997) ("Determining whether an accommodation presents an undue hardship re-
quires a fact-specific analysis of the costs and logistical difficulties imposed on the employ-
er's resources."). 
42. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating 
that even when the employee establishes that a particular accommodation is reasonable, 
the employer can still show that the costs of the accommodation are too high relative to 
either the accommodation's benefits or the employer's financial condition). 
43. See id. ("[T]he function of the 'undue hardship' safe harbor ... is to excuse compli-
ance by a firm that is financially distressed, even though the cost of the accommodation to 
the firm might be less than the benefit to disabled employees."). 
44. See Cath Sullivan, What's in a Name? Definitions and Conceptualisations of Tele-
worhing and Homeworhing, 18 NEW TECH., WORK & EMP'T 158, 159 (2003) ("As telework is 
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over time, the definition evolved by necessity.45 This was largely 
because of the difficulties posed in defining an emerging trend 
when its purpose is not yet clear.46 Ultimately, the use of technol-
ogy became the defining feature of telework and the means by 
which it was distinguished from other remote work or work-from-
home arrangements. 47 Today, broadly defined, telework is work 
performed remotely through the use of information and commu-
nication technology:18 
In the 1970s, Jack Nilles developed the idea of telework in re-
sponse to the Arab Oil Embargo and the recognition that fossil 
fuels were a finite resource. 49 Thus, during its origins, telework 
was seen primarily as a means to avoid commuting to work. 50 
However, later that decade, the use of the silicon chip resulted in 
a proliferation of personal computers and word-processing tech-
nology.51 Gradually, this led to a recognition that telework had 
functional benefits for professionals beyond its environmental 
use. 52 In addition to providing employees with a more flexible 
work schedule, teleworking helped employers save on overhead 
office costs, increased worker productivity, and decreased em-
·3 
ployee absences." 
As telecommuting technology advanced and the workforce be-
came less centralized, inevitably the law began to respond. In 
1999, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued 
a very varied and rapidly changing phenomenon, it is inevitable that any general defini-
tion will also be broad."). 
45. See generally id. at 159-60 (describing how the original conception of the term tel-
ework was a way to avoid commuting but has since shifted to include remote working by 
utilizing information and communication technologies). 
46. Cf id. at 158-59 ("The breadth and complexity of the phenomena under study 
make defining telework and work at home particularly difficult."). 
47. See id. at 159 ("Technology is a crucial element in the distinction between tele-
work and other forms of decentralised work and work at home."). 
48. Id. 
49. See Kurt Heymers, Telecommuting: Attempts at the Re-Integration of Worh and 
Family, Morm!SVILLE S'I'. C. (1996), http://sociology.morrisville.edu/infospace/telecomm.ht 
ml. 
50. Sullivan, supra note 44, at 159. As a result of its early use as a means to avoid 
commutes, the term "telework" is often used synonymously with "telecommute." Id. 
51. See Heymers, supra note 49 (discussing how people became aware of the silicon 
chip and the subsequent impact this awareness had on computer technology in the work-
place). 
52. See id. 
53. Dawn R Swink, Telecommuter Law: A New Frontier in Legal Liability, 38 All!. 
Bus. L.J. 857, 861-62 (2001). 
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an advisory letter on safety issues pertaining t9 work-at-home ar-
rangements.54 In the same year, the Department of Labor includ-
ed a definition of "homeworker" in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions ("C.F.R.") definitions section concerning the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. 55 Subsequently, a plethora of issues arose regard-
ing the right of teleworkers to receive workers' compensation 
benefits for injuries incurred at a home office.56 However, despite 
the various impacts of introducing telework into the American 
workforce, perhaps the most profound and controversial changes 
concern whether teleworking is considered a reasonable accom-
modation under the ADA. While the ADA itself does not directly 
address the issue of teleworking, courts have increasingly ad-
dressed the issue over the past two decades.57 
B. The Evolution of Telework Technology 
Though modern technology has facilitated teleworking ar-
rangements generally, certain telecommunication technologies 
developed over the past two decades have profoundly impacted 
telework. This section provides a brief discussion of each of these 
areas: mobile phones, the Internet, cloud technology, and robotic 
telepresence. 
1. Mobile Phones 
The idea for the mobile phone (or cell phone, as it is commonly 
known) existed long before the technology developed to make it a 
reality. 58 In the late 1940s, an American engineer named D.H. 
54. RICHARD E. FAIRFAX, OSHA POLICIES CONCERNING EMPLOYEES WORKING AT 
HOME, OSHA STANDARD INTERPRETATION AND COMPLIANCE LETTERS (Nov. 15, 1999), 
www.osha.gov/as/opa/foia/hot_ 4.html. This response was subsequently withdrawn by 
OSHA on Jan. 5, 2000. See id. 
55. Employment of Homeworkers in Certain Industries, 29 C.F.R. § 530.1 (1999) (de-
fining homeworker to be "any employee employed or suffered or permitted to perform in-
dustrial homework for an employer"). 
56. See Swink, supra note 53, at 874-75 (discussing various workers' compensation 
issues arising based on injuries incurred while telecommuting). 
57. See id. at 893-94 ("Although the ADA does not address telecommuting directly as 
a reasonable accommodation, several courts have suggested that employers must at least 
consider telecommuting as an accommodation for disabled employees, recognizing that 
employers will only be expected to allow telecommuting as an accommodation under cer· 
tain circumstances."). 
58. Jon Agar, Learning from the Mobile Phone, 151 RSA J. 26, 26 (2004) ("[T]he idea 
2015] THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE WORK 1239 
Ring developed the idea of "cellularity," whereby radio signals 
would be divided into cells to allow for independent communica-
tions among speakers.59 However, the technology and the market 
for such a device developed very slowly, and the first mobile 
phone did not appear in the U.S. market until 1983.60 
Since its commercialization, mobile-phone technology has rap-
idly evolved. In the early 1990s, "second generation," or 2G, mo-
bile phones with digital technology allowed for better phone bat-
teries, downloading capabilities, and text messaging.61 In the late 
1990s, 3G phones increased data download speeds as well as the 
number of uses for data.62 As modern phones transition into 4G, 
also known as Long Term Evolution ("LTE"), processing power 
and storage capacity currently double approximately every eight-
een months.63 These changes have had a profound impact on tel-
ework. While basic cell phone technology has enabled employers 
and employees to contact one another from virtually any location 
outside the office, smartphone technology now provides even more 
data-sharing capabilities whereby teleworkers can share docu-
ments, graphics, videos, or charts almost instantly from remote 
locations.64 
2. The Internet 
Not only has the Internet on its own had the most profound 
impact on modern teleworking arrangements of any technology, it 
also serves as the foundation for other critical telecommunica-
for a cellular phone was written down as early as 1947, yet the product did not take off 
until the 1980s."). 
59. See id. 
60. The History of Mobile Phones, DERBY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.der 
bytelegraph.co.uk/HISTORY-MOBILE-PHONES/story-11635326-detail/story.html. 
61. Id. 
62. See Louis E. Frenzel, What's the Difference Between 30 and 40 Cellular Systems?, 
ELECTRONIC DESIGN (Jan. 25, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://electronicdesign.com/4g/what·S· 
difference-between-3g-and-4g-cellular-systems. 
63. See id. (discussing LTE and 4G concepts); Jim Lynch, How Cell Phones and Tab· 
lets Enable 1'eleworh, TECHSOUP (Apr. 25, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://forums.techsoup.org/cs 
/community/b/tsblog/archive/2014/04/25/how-cell-phones-tablets-enable-telework.aspx 
("The processing power of our mobile phones roughly doubles every 18 months as does 
storage capacity, as do Internet speeds with the advent of faster 4G and 4G L'l'E mobile 
networks."). 
64. See Lynch, supra note 63; MOBILE WOHK EXCH., STRAIGHT TALK ON TELEWOHK 
TECHNOLOGY (2008), available at http://www.mobileworkexchange.com/uploads/2000/ 
1741-1 7288_MWE_ W'l'P _StraightTalk White Pa per. pdf. 
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tions technology. 65 Like the mobile phone, the initial idea for the 
Internet arose many years before the technology was available 
when in 1962, J.C.R. Licklider, an MIT professor, wrote a series 
of memos describing the idea of a "Galactic Network."66 Yet it was 
not until the early 1970s that Internet developers began to make 
substantive technological progress. 67 Moreover, the Internet did 
not become available as a commercial product in the United 
States until the early 1990s.68 Since that time, the Internet has 
expanded and evolved on an unprecedented scale. Across the 
world, over three billion people use the Internet, with nearly all of 
them connecting on a daily basis.69 
One of the foundational elements of the Internet is its function 
as a means for communication.70 Thus, the Internet has undoubt-
edly revolutionized telecommunications technology and dramati-
cally expanded teleworking opportunities. From simple concepts 
like email to complex systems such as telepresence, the Internet 
has made long-distance communication and information sharing 
vastly more simple than it was at the inception of teleworking.71 
3. Cloud Technology 
Roughly defined, cloud technology (or cloud computing) in-
volves the virtual storage of information on a network as opposed 
65. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTEHNET SOCIETY 1 (Oct. 
15, 2002), http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/ default/files/Brief_History _of_the_Internet. 
p<lf ("The Internet has revolutionized the computer and communications world like noth-
ing before."). 
66. See id. at 2. 
67. See id. at 3 (discussing the ability of users to develop applications and the first 
public demonstration of certain networking technology in the early 1970s). 
68. See Shane Greenstein, Innovation and the Evolution of Marhet Structure for In-
ternet Access in the United States 2 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion 
Paper No. 05-18, July, 2006), available at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/05-
18.pdf (identifying 1993 as the point in time when the Internet was commercialized). 
69. See Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WOHLD STATS (June 30, 2014), http:// 
www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2015) (providing data on the 
number of Internet users worldwide); see also Global Internet User Survey 2012, INTEHNET 
SOCIETY, http://www.internetsociety.org/surveyexplorer/key_findings (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015) ("Internet users nearly universally (96 percent) indicated they accessed the Internet 
at least once a day."). 
70. See Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, What Is the Internet (And What Mahes It 
Worli), CORP. FOR NAT'L RES. INITIATIVES (Dec. 1999), http://www.cnri.reston.va.us/what 
_is_internet.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2003) (indicating that the Internet was designed 
to provide a means for both "communications capabilities and information services"). 
71. See id. 
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to ~ computer's physical hard drive.72 Although the development 
of cloud technology somewhat parallels that of the Internet, its 
wide-scale usage as a business tool has only recently developed.73 
Cloud technology in the corporate world has become massively 
popular and is on a path to soon become a $100 billion annual in-
d t 7-1 us ry. 
As a result of its increasing popularity and availability, cloud 
computing is now one of the biggest players in modern telework-
ing technology. 75 Many major corporations such as Google, Apple, 
and Microsoft now offer limited cloud storage space free of 
charge.76 Moreover, publicly available cloud services often offer 
better IT services than employers possess independently.77 Such 
easy and cheap access to effective virtual information sharing 
makes it a particularly enticing option for employers considering 
telework.78 Moreover, these options leave little excuse for employ-
ers who might claim that work-at-home arrangements are not 
feasible. While employers sometimes cite concerns such as securi-
ty or privacy as a reason to oppose cloud computing,79 these ex-
cuses have become less compelling in the modern world of highly 
security-conscious cloud services.80 
72. Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing, PC MAG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.pc 
mag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp. 
73. See Arif Mohamed, A History of Cloud Computing, COMPUTER WKLY. (Mar. 27, 
2009), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/A·history·of·cloud·computing (discussing 
the development of cloud computing from its conception in the 1960s to more modern us· 
age). The concept of being able to access data from any location is attributed to J.C.R. 
Licklider's network ideas in the 1960s. Id. 
74. Griffith, Sllpra note 72. 
75. See David Linthicum, 'Telecommuting and Cloud Computing: For Innovators Only, 
INFOWORLD (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2613694/cloud·computing/ 
telecommuting·and-cloud-computing-for-innovators-only.html ("While a remote workforce 
issue is typically not the only benefit that drives business to the cloud, it's often on the ra-
dar. Moreover, companies innovative enough to create a strong remote workforce are typi-
cally the organizations that accept cloud computing."). 
76. Lisa Eadicicco, Which Cloud Storage Is Cheapest? How Prices for Google Drive, 
Dropbox, iCloud, and OneDrive Compare, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2014, 8:12 AM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/best-cloud-storage-price-google-drive-dropbox-icloud-one-drive· 
2014-12. 
77. See Linthicum, supra note 75. 
78. See id. (identifying better IT services as a reason why cloud technology is enticing 
for employers that allow work-at-home arrangements). 
79. Id. 
80. See Martyn Casserly, 7 Best Cloud Storage Services 2015: Dropbox vs Google 
Drive, OneDrive, iCloud & More, PC ADVISOH (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/fe 
atures/internet/3506734/best-cloud-storage-dropbox-google-drive-onedrive-icloud/ (indicat· 
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4. Robotic Telepresence 
Robotic telepresence is an emerging form of communications 
technology that enables a remote user to project their likeness on-
to a mobile robot, which can then roam around an environment.81 
While cloud technology enables employees to digitally transfer 
data to their employer from a remote location, robotic tele-
presence takes this a step further by enabling employees to re-
motely transfer something more-their physical presence. 82 Thus, 
robotic telepresence has tremendous implications for the future of 
telework.83 For jobs that do not require manual labor, this tech-
nology leaves little to no work that an employee cannot perform 
remotely. Teleworking office workers can wander to a colleague's 
desk to have a quick conversation or catch the boss on his way out 
the door. 8·1 Doctors can remotely wander from room to room con-
versing with patients and interacting with staff.85 Security guards 
can monitor entire buildings while sitting at a desk. 86 To some ex-
tent, the possible applications of such technology is limited only 
by the creativity of the users. 
While robotic telepresence has not had the same impact on tel-
ework as mobile phones and cloud technology, it is poised to make 
a mark in the future. 87 Not only are several companies jumping on 
board with the idea, but costs are declining as well. 88 Moreover, 
ing security features available on different cloud providers). 
81. See ECONOMIST, supra note 6 ('"Robotic telepresence' ... allows people to move 
virtually through a distant building by remotely controlling a wheeled robot equipped with 
a camera, microphone, loudspeaker and screen displaying live video of its pilot's face."). 
82. See id. (explaining the function of telepresence robots). 
83. See Robots Are Changing the Future of Telecommuting, FAST COMPANY (Oct 22, 
2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1693845/robots-are-changing-future-telecom 
muting ("Proponents argue that [telepresence robots] are the natural outgrowth of perva-
sive connectivity, inexpensive broadband, and the realization that constant business travel 
is taxing on both people and the planet."). 
84. See ECONOMIST, supra note 6 ("They give their pilots the freedom to converse with 
anybody at the remote location-rolling over to the desk of a colleague, say, or accompany-
ing a busy boss on her way to a meeting-rather than limiting communication to a specific 
time in a special room."). 
85. See id. ("[Telepresence robots] allow doctors to conduct bedside consultations from 
afar .... "). 
86. See id. ("[Telepresence robots] provide a cheap way to patrol workplaces at 
night."). 
87. See id. ("Several start-ups are introducing new telepresence robots this year, and 
sales are growing as costs fall."). 
88. See id. 
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designers are developing ways to make the technology both more 
intelligent and lifelike.89 Indeed, robotic telepresence could easily 
be the future of telework. 
C. Traditional Application of the ADA to Teleworking 
Technology available to the modern teleworker is undoubtedly 
far beyond what it was when Congress passed the ADA in 1990.90 
This raises the question of how the courts have historically dealt 
with reasonable accommodation claims based on teleworking. 
One of the earliest cases applying ADA reasonable accommoda-
tion principles to teleworking arose just five years after the ADA 
passed. In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administra-
tion, a paraplegic program assistant for the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Administration suffered from pressure ulcers that re-
quired her to stay at home for weeks at a time.91 She requested 
that the division provide her with a desktop computer so she 
could perform work at home, but her supervisor denied the re-
quest.92 The employee sued under the ADA seeking to restore the 
sick leave that she used to compensate for the time she was con-
fined to her home.93 In an opinion that has been characterized as 
"one of the most hostile views regarding whether working at 
home constitutes a reasonable accommodation,"94 Chief Judge 
Posner resolutely held, "No jury ... could in our view be permit-
ted to stretch the concept of 'reasonable accommodation' so far."95 
A few months later, the Northern District of Georgia was pre-
sented with a similar claim in Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
whereby an employee was denied a requested accommodation to 
work at home due to "Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome," a 
condition which caused her to experience unusually strong ad-
verse reactions to chemicals in her workplace. 96 Relying heavily 
89. See id. 
90. Vande Zan.de v. Wis. Dep't of Adrnin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995); see supra 
notes 58-89 and accompanying text (discussing advances in teleworking technology). 
91. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543-44. 
92. Id. at 544. 
93. See id. 
94. See Sullenger, supra note 12, at 548. 
95. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544. 
96. 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1558, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995). 
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on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Vande Zande, the court found 
that "no reasonable jury, under the particular facts of this case, 
could find that allowing Plaintiff to work at home ... is a reason-
able accommodation."97 
Scholars often cite these cases and others for having created a 
strong presumption against teleworking that can only be over-
come by the most exceptional circumstances.98 However, other 
cases which are said to apply a more fact-specific approach to tel-
eworking contrast with this presumption.99 For example, in 
Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n, an employer denied a 
work-at-home arrangement for her employee who had demon-
strated "absenteeism and tardiness" due to her Obsessive Com-
pulsive Disorder. 100 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
work-at-home arrangement can be a reasonable accommodation 
"when the essential functions of the position can be performed at 
home and a work-at-home arrangement would not cause undue 
hardship for the employer."101 
However, starkly categorizing ADA teleworking cases as apply-
ing either a presumption of unreasonableness on one hand, or a 
fact-specific approach on the other, fails to contextualize tele-
working case law in light of the rapid developments in technology 
taking place over the past two decades. Courts that supposedly 
developed presumptions against telework were more likely mak-
ing fact-based determinations based upon the existing technology 
at the time. 102 For instance, Vande Zande, considered to be the 
97. Id. at 1566. 
98. See Sullenger, supra note 12, at 548-50 (identifying Vande Zande and Whilloch as 
examples of cases applying the "presumption-against-telecommuting approach"); see also 
Ludgate, supra note 41, at 1324-27 (examining Vande Zande and Whilloch for their "pre· 
sumption that telecommuting is an inappropriate accommodation"). 
99. See Sullenger, supra note 12, at 550-52 (citing three cases which apply a fact· 
specific approach to teleworking); see also Ludgate, supra note 41, at 1330 ("Two courts 
have used a fact-specific approach to examine the issue of telecommuting as a reasonable 
accommodation," finding it plausible). 
100. See 239 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2001). 
101. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136. A Massachusetts Court came to a similar conclusion 
in 2005. Smith v. Bell Atl., 829 N.E.2d 228, 241 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) ("We conclude that 
there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that allowing Smith to do sub· 
stantial amounts of her work at home ... was a reasonable accommodation."). 
102. See Bell Atl., 829 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 352 F.3d 
1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2004)) (noting that the distinction between courts which are favora· 
ble and unfavorable to teleworking as a reasonable accommodation are misleading be· 
cause of the "fact-specific, case-by-case analysis"). 
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seminal case for the presumption against teleworking, pertained 
to an employee who worked in the early 1990s. 103 This means that 
during much of Vande Zande's employment, it is likely that the 
Internet was not even available to her employer as a commercial 
product. 104 Moreover, the plaintiff in Whillock submitted her re-
quest to work at home in early 1993, a time when the commercial 
Internet was, at best, still in its infancy. 105 Indeed, it is highly 
likely the judges who decided these cases probably had little to no 
familiarity with the concept of the Internet at all. 106 Therefore, 
courts made these decisions well before the advent of some of the 
most significant telecommunications-based developments in the 
history of telework. 
This analysis is not intended to suggest that the Internet is the 
exclusive means by which teleworking is accomplished effectively, 
nor is it meant to say that ADA decisions approving telework as a 
reasonable accommodation perfectly correlate with technological 
advancement. However, it does provide context through which 
one can see how the alleged presumption against teleworking in 
cases such as Vande Zande and Whillock appear to be more fact-
specific determinations based on the communications technology 
that existed at the time. Even Chief Judge Posner seemed to rec-
ognize the limited nature of his supposed ban on telework by in-
dicating that it "will no doubt change as communications technol-
ogy advances."107 The inevitable conclusion is that courts in the 
early 1990s never actually developed a presumption against tele-
working, but instead applied the existing facts to the law, which 
required that accommodations be reasonable. 108 Subsequent cases 
103. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) 
("Vande Zande worked for the housing division ... for three years, beginning in January 
1990."); see also Sullenger, supra note 12, at 548 ("Vande Zande ... is representative of 
one of the most hostile views regarding whether working at home constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation."). 
104. See Greenstein, supra note 68, at 2 (identifying 1993 as the point in time when the 
Internet was commercialized). 
105. Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see 
Greenstein, supra note 68, at 8. 
106. See Greenstein, supra note 68, at 8 ("To a knowledgeable insider in 1993, the In-
ternet was still progressing, but it received no attention outside a very small technically 
oriented community."); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2014) 
("[T]eleconferencing technologies that most people could not have conceived of in the 1990s 
are now commonplace."). 
107. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544. 
108. See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
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further support this by noting that the apparent divide between 
courts finding teleworking accommodations unreasonable and 
those finding it potentially reasonable is "largely illusory," be. 
cause each case was individually decided based on its specific 
facts. 109 
Refuting the existence of a presumption against telework is 
important in showing that a court's determination as to whether 
telework is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA is not 
based upon a judge's arbitrary decision, but rather is "closely tied 
to the technology available to make the accommodation reasona-
ble."110 Unsurprisingly, the D.C. Circuit recently noted that 
"[t]echnological advances and the evolving nature of the work-
place" have made it "rare that any particular type of accommoda-
tion will be categorically unreasonable as a matter of law."111 This 
suggests that, over time, the threshold for which a court is willing 
to declare that an employer must accommodate their employee 
through telework has become, and will continue to remain, in-
creasingly low. 112 As the Sixth Circuit recently noted in EEOC v. 
Ford Motor Co., "[T]eleconferencing technologies that most people 
could not have conceived of in the 1990s are now commonplace."113 
While it is clear that courts have adapted, and will continue to 
adapt, their case-by-case analysis to evolving technology, the per-
tinent question now becomes what this shift means for ADA ju-
risprudence. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012)) ("Under the ADA, the term 'discriminate' is defined as 
including 'not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employ-
ee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."'). 
109. Smith v. Bell At!., 829 N.E.2d 228, 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (citing Mason v. 
Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
110. Cf. id. (noting that the distinction between courts' approaches to teleworking as a 
reasonable accommodation are misleading because of the "fact-specific, case-by-case anal-
ysis"). 
111. Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
112. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he law must 
respond to the advance of technology in the employment context, as it has in other areas of 
modern life .... "). 
113. Id. at 642. 
I 
l 
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Ill. ADA ADAPTATIONS TO INNOVATIONS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY 
1247 
As communications technology becomes increasingly available 
in the workplace, courts are being forced to confront these trans-
formations. This part concludes that in order to sufficiently ad-
dress these changes, courts must adopt a new reasonable accom-
modation test whereby they consider whether the work-at-home 
accommodation renders the employee functionally present at the 
traditional workplace for the purposes of his or her job duties. 
A. Attendance Versus Physical Presence 
"[T]echnology evolves in an unpredictable way."114 As a result, 
courts must not only recognize technological changes, but also en-
sure that the law responds appropriately. 115 Employment law is 
no exception. 116 Though courts have become more willing to con-
sider teleworking as a reasonable accommodation as telecommu-
nications technology advances, 117 courts have only recently begun 
to recognize that technology is fundamentally changing the way 
that it must analyze the ADA. 118 In other words, when applying a 
fact-specific approach to ADA jurisprudence, the evolving facts 
not only change the outcomes, but also change the way the law 
itself is applied. 119 
This is most evident in the recent Sixth Circuit decision, EEOC 
v. Ford Motor Co. 120 There, a Ford employee suffered from Irrita-
ble Bowel Syndrome ("IBS"), a condition which caused her to ex-
perience severe incontinence. 121 As her condition worsened, it be-
114. ANTONIO VAzQUEZ-BARQUERO, ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT; NETWORKING, 
INNOVATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CITIES 77 (2002). 
115. Cf. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641 n.2 ("The Justices of the Supreme Court have 
recognized the law's evolution in response to advancing technology in a number of differ-
ent contexts."). 
116. Id. at 641 ("[T]he law must respond to the advance of technology in the employ-
ment context, as it has in other areas of modern life .... "). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 98-113 (discussing courts' openness to finding 
reasonable accommodations due to advancing technology). 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 120-46 (discussing the impact of the Ford Mo-
tor Co. case on ADA jurisprudence). 
119. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 637. 
1248 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1229 
came difficult for her to drive to work or even stand up from her 
desk. 122 After several months, the employee made a formal re-
quest to telecommute as an accommodation for h,er IBS. 123 Ford 
denied her request and she subsequently filed a. discrimination 
claim with the EEOC. 121 The EEOC moved forward with her case, 
filing a complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan for, inter 
alia, a failure to accommodate the plaintiffs disability under the 
ADA. 125 The district court dismissed the case on summary judg-
ment, finding that the "request to telecommute ... was not area-
sonable accommodation."126 The district court also found that the 
employee was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA based 
upon her "excessive absenteeism."127 
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit 
found that the employee was plainly a qualified individual under 
the ADA because, absent some proof that physical attendance in 
the workplace was necessary for her job, she was "otherwise qual-
ified" for her position. 128 Therefore, the burden shifted to Ford to 
show "that physical presence in the workplace is an 'essential 
function' of [her position]."129 
The Sixth Circuit placed unique importance on physical pres-
ence in this case because it recognized that as telecommunica-
tions technology has advanced, attendance in the workplace is no 
longer synonymous with physical presence. 130 In essence, for 
many jobs, it is not necessary that an employee actually attend 
the physical work location in order to be present at their job. The 
emergence of cell phones, email, and teleconferencing technology 
means that employees can remotely communicate with their em-
ployer. Cloud technology means that employees can retrieve and 
send documents, pictures, charts, files, or virtually any form of 
data through the Internet. Furthermore, technology as sophisti-
cated as robotic telepresence means that employees can even rep-
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 637-38. 
124. Id. at 638. 
125. Id. at 639. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 640. 
129. Id. at 640-41. 
130. See id. at 641 ("[A]s technology has advanced ... attendance at the workplace can 
no longer be assumed to mean attendance at the employer's physical location."). 
1 
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licate their physical presence in the office from a remote loca-
tion. i:n · 
As a result of these changes, courts must now reconsider their 
definition of the workplace, and in so doing, shift the focus of the 
analysis away from attendance and toward physical presence. 132 
In its "Enforcement Guidance" on the matter, the EEOC even 
recognized that "[a]ttendance ... is not an essential function as 
defined by the ADA because it is not one of 'the fundamental job 
duties of the employment position."'J:l3 However, as David Fram of 
the National Employment Law Institute has noted, courts "al-
most uniformly say the opposite."131 
For example, in Vande Zande, Chief Judge Posner relied on the 
Fourth Circuit case, Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Inc., 
as support for his claim that the unreasonableness of teleworking 
as an accommodation was a majority view. 135 In Tyndall, the court 
addressed an ADA discrimination claim based upon, inter alia, 
the employer's failure to accommodate a medical condition that 
caused excessive absences from work. 136 However, there was no 
claim in Tyndall that the employer failed to provide an oppor-
tunity for the plaintiff to work at home. 137 Instead, the claim 
seemed to be based more upon the employer's failure to provide 
adequate leaves of absence. 138 The court held that "a regular and 
reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most jobs" 
and "[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance require-
ments of the job at issue cannot be considered a 'qualified' indi-
vidual protected by the ADA."1a9 
131. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 5. 
132. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641 (criticizing the dissent's characterization of 
the "workplace" and the "physical worksite provided by the employer" as synonymous). 
133. Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC n.65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(l) (2014)) 
(last modified Oct. 22, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html. 
134. C. Reilly Larson, NELi Addresses Disabilities, EEOC on Pregnancy, Wellness, 65 
BULL. TO MGMT. 319, 319 (2014). 
135. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1995). 
136. Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1994). 
137. See id. at 211. 
138. See id. at 212. We are simply told that one of the complaints was that the defend-
ant "failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability prior to her termina-
tion." Id. However, the claim did arise shortly after she was denied additional leave, sug-
gesting that this was the accommodation about which she was complaining. See id. 
139. Id. at 213. 
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It is clear based upon Vande Zande's reliance on Tyndall that 
at the time, a failure to be physically present at work was seen a~ 
synonymous with a failure to attend work. 140 However, Vande 
Zaride was not the only court with this opinion:141 The Whillock 
court also cited Tyndall, noting that "regular attendance [is] an 
essential function of [the] Plaintiffs job."1·12 Even the district 
court's opinion in Ford Motor Co. cited Tyndall as a basis for find-
ing that the plaintiff was not qualified under the ADA. 143 
The strong link between absence from work and absence from a 
physical office will undoubtedly be challenging for proponents of 
the teleworking accommodation to overcome. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the Sixth Circuit vacated its deci-
sion in Ford Motor Co. and granted Ford en bane review. 144 Plain-
ly, there is a great deal of hesitance to accept the Sixth Circuit's 
original opinion that "attendance at the workplace can no longer 
be assumed to mean attendance at the employer's physical loca-
tion."1·15 'fhis trepidation is likely why Gail Coleman of the EEOC 
began her en bane oral argument by cautiously warning the court 
that "[t]his case is not a referendum on telework in general."146 
However, the original decision by the Sixth Circuit does in fact 
suggest that the courts are radically reconsidering their approach 
to telework under the ADA in recognition of the evolution in tele-
communications technology. 
140. Chief Judge Posner also relied upon the Federal Circuit's decision in Law v. Unit-
ed States Postal Service to support his opinion. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544-45. However, 
unlike Tyndall, this case did not pertain to an ADA claim, but rather was based on a re-
view of the U.S. Postal Service's removal of an employee from his position. Law v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Nonetheless, as with Tyn-
dall, the Law court relied heavily on attendance as a basis for its decision. Id. at 1279-80. 
141. See Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995); 
Ludgate, supra note 41, at 1331 ("The Vande Zande and Whillock courts relied on exces-
sive absenteeism cases for the presumption that because virtually all jobs require physical 
presence in the workplace, telecommuting is rarely an appropriate accommodation."). 
142. Whilloch, 926 F. Supp. at 1564 . 
. 143. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 10, 2012). 
144. Order Vacating Judgment, EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-2484). 
145. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) vacated en bane, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17852 (6th Cir. 2014). 
146. Courtroom Audio: EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-
2484), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.ca6. 
uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/audSearchRes.php. 
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B. Future Interpretations of ADA Telework Cases 
It is now well established that in determining whether a par-
ticular accommodation under the ADA is reasonable, courts use a 
fact-specific or case-by-case analysis. 147 In fact, the relational na-
ture of the term "reasonable" necessitates such analysis. 148 Courts 
must look to the particular facts of each case to assess the rela-
tive costs and benefits to each party. 149 As discussed previously, 
some courts' alleged uses of "presumptions" against telework as a 
reasonable accommodation are largely illusory due to the existing 
technology when those decisions were made.150 Moreover, any 
such determination that telework under the ADA is per se unrea-
sonable would inevitably conflict with unforeseen future innova-
tions in telecommunications technology. 151 
However, while assessing each case based on its individual 
facts accommodates these innovations, it also tends to yield un-
predictable outcomes. 152 When judges are given wide discretion to 
determine what is "reasonable" based on the particular facts of 
each case, decisions are largely ad hoc, leaving little room for 
precedent. 153 A wide range of judicial opinions result, leaving em-
ployers with little idea as to whether they have a legal obligation 
to provide a particular accommodation and potentially subjecting 
them to extensive jury trials. 154 
This extreme subjectivity under the ADA is particularly prob-
lematic for employers facing the question of whether to permit 
147. See, e.g., Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
("Whether or not something constitutes a reasonable accommodation is necessarily fact· 
specific. Therefore, determinations on this issue must be made on a case-by-case basis.") 
(internal citation omitted). 
148. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
149. Id. 
150. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
151. See Ludgate, supra note 41, at 1335 ("Unlike a presumption analysis, a fact· 
specific approach requires courts to acknowledge technological change .... [T]he final de· 
cision under a fact-specific approach will reflect the actual feasibility of telecommuting in 
a particular circumstance, rather than rely on outdated and inaccurate assumptions."). 
152. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial 
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination 
Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 78-79 (1999). 
153. Id. at 79. 
154. See id. at 79-80 (stating that the "individualized inquiry approach" hinders courts 
from establishing precedent and makes any ADA case a strong prospect for a long jury tri-
al). 
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their employee to telecommute. Indeed, it would have been nearly 
impossible for Ford to predict that the Sixth Circuit would dra-
matically change course from its decision in Smith v. Ameritech 
less than two decades earlier in which it agreed with Chief Judge 
Posner that employers are not required to permit disabled em-
ployees to telework "where their productivity inevitably would be 
greatly reduced."155 Yet, the Ford Motor Co. court noted that "tele-
conferencing technologies that most people could not have con-
ceived of in the 1990s are now commonplace."156 
Fortunately, decisions on these matters need not be entirely 
arbitrary. Individuals are "qualified" under the ADA where they, 
"with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the employment position."157 This means that 
the question as to whether one can telework as a reasonable ac-
commodation may ultimately be a question of whether one's phys-
ical presence is an essential function of their job.158 
Here, courts can look to regulatory law for guidance. 159 In Ford 
Motor Co., the Sixth Circuit identified factors in the C.F.R. to 
help determine whether physical presence at the employer's 
worksite was an essential function of the employee's job duties. 160 
These include "written job descriptions, the business judgment of 
the employer, the amount of time spent performing the function, 
and the work experience of past and present employees in the 
same or similar positions."161 In addition, the EEOC has posted a 
155. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Vande Zande v. 
Wis. Dep't Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
156. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated en bane, 2014 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 (6th Cir. 2014). 
157. 42 u.s.c. § 12111(8) (2012). 
158. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641 ("[T]he vital question in this case is ... 
whether physical presence at the Ford facilities was truly essential."). 
159. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2014) (identifying factors to consider for deter-
mining whether a job activity is an essential function). 
160. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641; see also Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 
227 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir. 2000) (identifying the C.F.R. factors as a means to determine 
the essential functions of a deputy position). 
161. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641. Other factors identified in the C.F.R. include: 
"The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; The terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement; ... ancl/or ... [t]he current work experience of incum-
bents in similar jobs." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). However, the court in Ford Motor Co. did 
not reference these, likely because it did not find them relevant to the facts of the case. See 
Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641. 
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fact sheet identifying specific factors to consider in order to de-
termine "the feasibility of working at home" including: 
the employer's ability to supervise the employee adequately[;] 
whether any duties require use of certain equipment or tools that 
cannot be [replaced or] replicated at home[;] ... whether there is a 
need for face-to-face interaction and coordination of work with other 
employees; whether in-person interaction with outside colleagues, 
clients, or customers is necessary; and whether the position in ques-
tion requires the employee to have immediate access to documents or 
other information located only in the workplace.
162 
However, both the C.F.R. and the EEOC Fact Sheet have defi-
ciencies in their ability to create predictable outcomes in ADA 
telework cases. The C.F.R. factors were published in the Federal 
Register in 1991,163 well before the first major ADA telecommut-
ing case had even reached the federal circuit courts. 161 As a result, 
the regulations tend to consider elements that do not make sense 
when applied to a determination of whether physical presence in 
the office is an essential function of one's job.165 For example, "the 
amount of time spent performing the function" is a factor that 
was likely intended to address situations where a worker needed 
an accommodation to perform a specific physical task, as opposed 
to circumstances where they were away from the worksite entire-
ly. 166 Indeed, even after the Ford Motor Co. court referenced the 
C.F.R. considerations, only one of them-"the business judgment 
162. Worh At Home/1'eleworh as a Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC, http:l/eeoc.gov/ 
facts/telework.html (last modified Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter EEOC Fact Sheet]. 
163. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 
35, 726, 35,726-29 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
164. Vancle Zancle u. Wisconsin Department of Administration, decided on January 5, 
1995, appears to be the first federal circuit court case on teleworking under the ADA. 44 
F.:3d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 1995). Vande Zande does cite other cases as illustrating the "major-
ity view" on the matter. Id. at 544-45. However, these decisions either did not relate to 
telework, or did not pertain to the ADA. See, e.g., Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 
211 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The question in this case is whether an employer violated the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, by discharging a disabled employee who was frequently absent 
from work due to her disability and the disability of a family member.") (internal citation 
omitted); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[The plaintiff] sued under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Civil Service Reform Act, claiming that handicap dis-
crimination motivated her discharge."). 
165. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641 (explaining that attendance at a workplace 
can no longer be assumed to mean attendance at the employer's physical location). 
166. Sec, e.g., Cremeens v. City of Montgomery, 427 F. App'x 855, 857-58 (11th Cir. 
2011) (referencing the C.F.R. factors and determining that an essential function of a Fire 
Investigator position includes the physical task of fire suppression). 
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of the employer"-was directly applied to the facfs of the case. 167 
Even then, the court demonstrates how this factor is inherently 
unreliable in that it is highly subject to manipulation by the em-
1 168 p oyer. 
Alternatively, while the factors listed in the EEOC Fact Sheet 
are significantly more specific and relevant to teleworking as a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, they are nevertheless 
inadequate given that they are not binding upon any court. 169 
Furthermore, the EEOC characterizes these factors as those that 
should be used to determine "the feasibility of working at home," 
thus signaling to any court that might otherwise consider these 
factors that they are not pertinent to the legal question of wheth-
er teleworking is a reasonable accommodation. 110 Therefore, un-
less these factors are both reworded and codified, they will likely 
have minimal impact on creating a more consistent interpretation 
of teleworking under the ADA. 
C. Deriving a New Test from ADA Telework Case Law 
Ultimately, the most effective means of unearthing a usable 
test to determine whether telecommuting is reasonable under the 
ADA is to derive one from case law. Perhaps unknowingly, courts 
have been developing such a test since the earliest days of ADA 
teleworking analysis. As noted previously, Vande Zande did not 
actually develop a presumption against teleworking, but rather 
recognized the technology available at the time as patently inad-
equate to justify a finding that teleworking was a reasonable ac-
commodation.111 Therefore, the court left a small window of oppor-
tunity available for ADA teleworking advocates, finding that "it 
would take a very extraordinary case for the employee to be able 
167. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641-42 (referencing factors to consider from the 
C.F.R., briefly discussing Ford's argument about teamwork, and subsequently discussing 
the business judgment factor). 
168. Id. at 642 n.3 ("[A]n employer can just as easily provide self-serving testimony 
that even marginal job functions are absolutely essential."). 
169. See EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 162. 
170. See id. ("Several factors should be considered in determining the feasibility of 
working at home .... "). 
171. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (refuting the presumption against 
telework). 
2015] THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE WORK 1255 
to create a triable issue of the employer's failure to allow the em-
ployee to work at home."172 . 
There is similar language in Tyndall, the predecessor case to 
Vande Zande, discussing reasonable accommodations in the con-
text of leave of absences. 173 There, the court noted the importance 
of consistent attendance at work, but again left an opportunity 
available for "the unusual case where an employee can effectively 
perform all work-related duties at home."174 A few years later, the 
Sixth Circuit consolidated this language in Ameritech, citing the 
limited exceptions from both Tyndall and Vande Zande, but still 
concluded that this case was not "one of those exceptional cases 
where [the plaintiff] could have 'performed at home without a 
substantial reduction in the quality of [his] performance."'175 
Nonetheless, the court seemed to signal that it would consider 
teleworking as a reasonable accommodation in rare instances 
where all of the employee's work could be performed at home 
without any significant reduction in quality. 176 
Interestingly, just as the court seemed to become more amena-
ble to teleworking as technology advanced from the Vande Zande 
court in 1995 to the Humphrey court in 2001, 177 the test evolved as 
well. 178 In Humphrey, the court stated that teleworking was a rea-
sonable accommodation under the ADA where "the essential 
functions of the position can be performed at home and a work-at-
home arrangement would not cause undue hardship for the em-
ployer."179 Here, the court did not mention the need for exception-
al cases, but instead simply required that the essential functions 
of the job could be done at home to justify a showing of a reasona-
172. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995). 
173. See Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1994). 
174. Id. at 213. 
175. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Vande Zande, 44 
F.3d at 544). 
176. See id. 
177. See supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text (indicating that the supposed pre-
sumption against telework is more likely a fact-based approach that changed based upon 
the evolution of technology). 
178. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 643 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that 
there are significantly more cases now in which an employee can work effectively from 
home than at the time when telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation was consid-
ered rare). 
179. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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ble accommodation. 180 With such a finding, the court signaled that 
effective work-at-home arrangements were no longer anomalies. 181 
As such, it is now important that a modern test for teleworking 
as a reasonable accommodation accounts for the leaps telecom-
munications technology made over the past decade. Such a test 
must not only recognize the importance of the employee's ability 
to effectively perform his or her work from home, but must also 
account for the changing definition of the workplace. 182 Thus, the 
new test for determining whether a teleworking accommodation 
is reasonable under the ADA should ask the following: Does the 
work-at-home accommodation render the employee functionally 
present at his or her traditional workplace for the purposes of the 
job duties?' 
This test would be valuable in that it would not only recognize 
the evolution of tests that courts have previously applied, but 
would also capture the elements the EEOC identified as im-
portant in determining whether teleworking should be an ADA 
accommodation. For example, the EEOC Fact Sheet suggests that 
an important consideration for determining whether to incorpo-
rate a telework arrangement is "the employer's ability to super-
vise the employee adequately."183 If a court were to find a major 
supervisory deficiency in a particular teleworking arrangement, 
by necessity that court would find the employee was not function-
ally present for the purposes of his or her job duties. Moreover, 
the EEOC asks whether the job "require[s] use of certain equip-
ment or tools that cannot be replicated at home."181 Thus, when 
the key instrumentalities of an employee's work could not be used 
from his or her teleworking location, a court could not find that 
the arrangement rendered the employee functionally present at 
the traditional workplace. 
180. Id. 
181. Compare Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(identifying a reasonable work at home accommodation as the "extraordinary case"), with 
Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136 (identifying the conditions for a work-at-home accommoda-
tion to be considered reasonable). 
182. Cf. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641 (explaining that the definition of the work-
place has evolved so that attendance at work does not necessarily mean attendance at the 
employer's physical workplace). 
183. EEOC Fact Sheet, supra note 162. 
184. Id. 
,f• 
;;l015]. THERE IS NO PLACE LIKE WORK 1257 
'rhis test would also allow the court to appropriately adapt its 
£\:oalysis to modern telecommunications technology. Advances 
over the past twenty years rendered many tasks Internet-based 
to the extent that performing them remotely could not possibly 
J'.'educe the quality of the work. 185 In fact, research suggests that 
work-from-home jobs are likely to increase employee perfor-
niance, attitude, and satisfaction without negatively impacting 
the in-office workers. 186 While there are still many tasks whose 
performance cannot be replicated by technology, a new test that 
differentiated between work that can and cannot be reproduced in 
a teleworking arrangement would help courts draw clearer 
boundaries. 
Undoubtedly, this test would not be a perfect solution. It would 
continue to leave room for a great deal of interpretation based 
upon the facts of each case and would almost inevitably yield in-
consistent decisions among circuits. 187 However, the flexibility to 
make case-by-case determinations is an inherent feature of the 
ADA that cannot be undone without disrupting the fundamental 
purpose of the legislation itself. 188 The function of this test would 
be to draw a line against which employers, employees, and courts 
could measure how far a teleworking accommodation can go in 
light of technological innovation. It provides the necessary room 
for courts to exercise discretion while simultaneously providing 
employers and employees a means by which they can feel more 
secure in accepting or denying a requested work-at-home ar-
rangement. Though uncertainty will inevitably remain, this test 
provides the ideal compromise. 
185. See, e.g., infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
186. See Nicholas Bloom et al., Does Working from Home Work? Evidence from a Chi-
nese Experiment (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18871, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18871.pdf. 
187. Cf Befort & Thomas, supra note 152, at 78-79 (stating that the individualized 
approach to analyzing reasonable accommodation and undue hardship under the ADA re-
sults in differing judicial decisions and hinders the creation of precedent). 
188. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that "reasonable" is a "relational term" that requires the court to balance the 
costs and benefits of an accommodation); see also Ludgate, supra note 41, at 1336 ("[T]he 
EEOC regulations explicitly state that the pursue of a fact-specific approach is to allow 
disabled individuals to successfully pursue a wide variety of employment opportunities."). 
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·IV. EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO ADA TELEWORK CLAIMS 
Courts are now more willing to consider teleworking as a 
means by which employers are required to accommodate disabled 
employees under the ADA. However, even when presented with 
opportunities to utilize the most advanced telecommunications 
technology, the ADA does not require all employers to accommo-
date disabled employees with teleworking arrangements. Two 
possible defenses are particularly relevant for employers faced 
with a prima facie claim for discrimination under the ADA based 
on a failure to accommodate through telework. 
A. The Employee Cannot Perform the "Essential Functions" of the 
Job 
First, an employer can negate the contention that the employee 
is a "qualified individual" under the ADA by demonstrating that 
he or she would be unable to perform the essential functions of 
the job even with an accommodation. 189 When an employee suc-
cessfully demonstrates that a teleworking arrangement is a rea-
sonable accommodation, the employer would then be required to 
demonstrate that the employee's physical presence is truly an es-
sential function of his or her work. 190 Even under the aforemen-
tioned test, whereby a court might ask whether the teleworking 
arrangement rendered the employee functionally present in the 
office, employers can still point to a number of job elements sug-
gesting that physical presence is essential. 
One reason employers often cite in arguing for the necessity of 
physical presence in the office is the notion that teamwork and 
personal interaction are key elements of effective work perfor-
mance.191 After facing heavy criticism for revoking Yahoo's work-
189. See Hedrick v. W. Heserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452-53 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996)) (explaining the bur-
den shifting arrangement under the ADA). 
190. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated en bane, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that the critical question is whether 
physical presence was an essential function of the job). 
191. See Hauen v. U.S. Tobacco Mfg. Ltd. P'ship, 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2003) 
("The reason working at home is rarely a reasonable accommodation is because most jobs 
require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be 
had in a home office situation."). 
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from-home policy, Marissa Mayer, the company's CEO, defended 
her decision by alleging that "people are ... more collaborative 
and innovative when they're together."192 In Ford Motor Co., Ford 
raised a similar claim among its principal defenses, alleging that 
physical presence "was critical to the group dynamic of the resale-
buyer team."193 Undoubtedly, this argument persuades many 
courts.194 However, as the Ford Motor Co. court noted, "[A]dvanc-
ing technology has diminished the necessity of in-person contact 
to facilitate group conversations."195 As communications technolo-
gy becomes more sophisticated and machinery-like robotic 
telepresence becomes more commonplace, courts will be forced to 
distinguish between the teamwork and social interaction fostered 
by physical presence and that which is provided through technol-
19s ogy. 
Another commonly used argument to support physical presence 
as an essential function of a job is the importance of employee su-
pervision.197 This appeared to be one of Chief Judge Posner's prin-
cipal concerns in Vande Zande when he stated, "Most jobs in or-
ganizations public or private involve team work under super-
vision rather than solitary unsupervised work."198 Multiple courts 
have denied teleworking accommodations citing this very reason-
. 199 mg. 
192. Christopher Tkaczyk, Marissa Mayer Breaks Her Silence on Yahoo's Telecommut-
ing Policy, FORTUNE (Apr. 19, 2013, 3:26 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/04/19/marissa-may 
er-breaks-her-silence-on-yahoos-telecommuting-policy/. 
193. See Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641-44 (explaining Ford's arguments pertaining 
to the importance of personal interaction in the workplace). 
194. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(agreeing with the district court that a lack of teamwork was one of the reasons why phys-
ical attendance at the worksite was an essential function of the employee's job); Rauen, 
319 F.3d at 896 (citing "teamwork" and "personal interaction" as some of the main reasons 
why work-from-home arrangements are often found unreasonable under the ADA); Hypes 
v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[The employee] was a part of 
a team and the efficient functioning of the team necessitated the presence of all mem-
bers."). 
195. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 642. 
196. See ECONOMIST, supra note 6 (indicating that many start-up companies intend to 
introduce telepresence robots). 
197. See, e.g., Rauen, 319 F.3d at 896 (citing supervision as a reason why a work-at-
home arrangement is "rarely a reasonable accommodation"). 
198. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995). 
199. See Mason, 357 F.3d at 1120, 1122 (referring to Chief Judge Posner's work super-
vision reasoning in Vande Zande as a basis for finding that physical presence is an "essen-
tial function" of the plaintiffs position); see also Leahr v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 
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Nonetheless, existing technology certainly raises the question 
as to whether this logic still applies today. A device as simple as a 
Google Doc enables an employer to oversee an employee's pro-
gress on a memo in real time. 200 Alternatively, websites such as 
GoToMyPC or LogMeln provide employers with the means to re-
motely access their employees' computers as they work.201 Finally, 
various webcam-monitoring options are available for employers 
who feel the need to physically observe their employees as they 
work.202 While these options can be intrusive, they may also be 
seen simply as the new form of supervision in a home-office set-
ting. 
Finally, some employers might allege that the specific charac-
teristics of their employees' work necessitates physical presence 
at the worksite. This argument is most persuasive for jobs that 
require manual labor or contact with customers and patients.203 
For example, in Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Medical Center, 
the Ninth Circuit noted that a neo-natal nurse is one of the prime 
examples of a position where "on-site regular attendance is an es-
sential job function."20'1 Among a litany of justifications, the court 
points to the need for interacting with patients face-to-face and 
utilizing medical equipment.205 Nonetheless, courts should not 
underestimate the ability of technology to enable employees to 
replicate their presence in these jobs as well. Indeed, hospitals 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10601, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (quoting language from Judge Posner 
regarding supervision as a basis for finding that the present work-at-home arrangement 
was not a reasonable accommodation). 
200. See Overview of Google Docs, Sheets, and Slides, GOOGLE, https://support.google. 
com/docs/answer/49008?hl=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
201. See GoToMyPC vs. LogMein, BEST REMOTE PC, http://www.bestremotepc.corn/com 
pare/gotomypc-vs-logmein/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) ("GoToMyPC and LogMein are two of 
the best remote access software companies in the business."). 
202. See Ishan Bansal, 5 Best Free Webcam Surveillance Software, I LOVE FREE 
SOFTWARE (June 5, 2010), http://www.ilovefreesoftware.com/05/windows/5-best-free-web 
cam-surveill ance-software.html. 
203. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating 
that production jobs are "almost certainly" not the types of jobs conducive to work-at-home 
arrangements). 
204. 675 F.3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2012). This case did not pertain to a requested work-
at-home arrangement, but instead focused on whether "regular attendance" was an essen-
tial function of a neo-natal intensive care unit (NICU) nurse's position. See id. at 1235, 
1237 ("This case turns on the role that regular attendance plays in the functions of a [sic] 
NICU nurse."). However, it nonetheless illustrates how certain jobs can be less conducive 
to work-at-home arrangements than others. 
205. Id. at 1238. 
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have expressed a major interest in utilizing telepresence robot 
technology to interact with patients when their personnel are not 
physically present. 206 
B. The Accommodation Places an Undue Hardship on the 
Employer 
Another defense employers can raise in response to an argu-
ment that they failed to reasonably accommodate their employee 
under the ADA is that the accommodation itself would place an 
undue hardship on the operations of the employer's business. 207 
This defense primarily applies when the costs of accommodation 
are excessive in light of either the benefits it provides or the fi-
nancial condition of the employer.208 
While many basic accommodations can be made at little to no 
h 1 209 d d cost to t e emp oyer, more a vance technology can cost hun-
dreds, or even thousands, of dollars to implement. 210 These costs 
have differing implications for the future of telework as an ac-
commodation under the ADA. First, larger and more financially 
stable employers will likely subsidize the development of ADA ju-
risprudence in the near future as it relates to telework, because 
these employers are less likely to have cases dismissed on the 
grounds that they could not afford a proposed accommodation.211 
As a result, they are more likely to be the targets of suits asking 
juries to decide whether the newest, cutting-edge telecommunica-
tions technology should have been used as an accommodation.212 
Secondly, as advanced telecommunications technology becomes 
more affordable, ADA requirements that this technology be used 
206. See ECONOMIST, supra note 6 (referencing hospitals' interest in telepresence robot 
technology). 
207. 42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
208. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (discussing the undue hardship de-
fense under the ADA). 
209. This might include accommodations whereby the employee simply needs to use 
means such as their own cell phone or an email account in order to work from home. 
210. See ECONOMIST, supra note 6 (identifying costs for telepresence robots ranging 
from a flat fee of $149 to $5000 per month). 
211. Cf. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (indicat-
ing that the undue hardship provision tends to excuse companies with who are financially 
struggling). 
212. Cf Befort & Thomas, supra note 152, at 80 ("The ADA's complicated antidiscrimi-
nation formula, implemented through an individualized mode of analysis, inevitably leads 
to a crush of litigation."). 
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to accommodate employees will likely become more widespread 
because employers will find themselves less able to claim that the 
accommodation poses an undue hardship due to its cost.213 This 
leaves virt_ually limitless implications for potential accommoda-
tions that all employers may be required to provide to· disabled 
employees in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
ADA teleworking analysis demonstrates how judicial interpre-
tations of the law must constantly evolve to accommodate innova-
tions in technology. Courts today are forced to consider whether a 
statute requires employers to utilize devices that did not exist 
when the law was passed. As a result, they must exercise their 
discretion with both caution and foresight. 
Over time, the tests that courts have applied to determine 
whether teleworking is a reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA have changed to adapt to unpredictable advances. When tel-
ecommunications technology made teleworking accommodations 
more practical, courts responded by acknowledging that ADA tel-
eworking accommodations were no longer the anomaly.211 When 
the definition of the workplace began to change, courts responded 
by recognizing that it must look to physical presence, as opposed 
to attendance, to determine whether the accommodation renders 
the employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or 
her job.215 
Today, courts must continue to advance its approach in re-
sponse to newer forms of technology that allow employees to more 
easily replicate their physical presence in an office. Courts can al-
low for these advances by asking whether the teleworking ac-
commodations render the employee functionally present in the of-
fice for the purposes of his or her job. In so doing, courts will be 
able to apply the ADA's reasonable accommodation analysis more 
213. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543 (indicating that an employer can overcome a 
showing that an accommodation is reasonable by demonstra~ing tha~ .the costs are too 
high relative to the benefits or relative to the employer's finar:cial cor:-d1t1on); ECONOMIST, 
supra note 6 (indicating that sales of telepresence robots are mcreasmg as costs to manu-
facture them are decreasing). 
214. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 647 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated en bane, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17252 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Swink, supra note 53, at 893-94. 
215. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d at 641. 
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specifically to telework. However, without these changes, courts 
may neglect opportunities for disabled individuals to continue to 
work when easy and effective alternatives are available. 
By making appropriate changes, courts can more effectively 
balance Congress's goal of preventing unjustified workplace dis-
crimination and employers' goals of hiring effective employees. 
While there are undoubtedly limits to the lengths that employers 
must go to accommodate an employee or prospective employee's 
disability, technology has dramatically reduced the extent to 
which these accommodations are unreasonable. 
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